Alessandro di Afrodisia e il De Interpretatione : il caso della proposizione

Alexander of Aphrodisias and De Interpretatione: the Case of the Proposition. This article considers a passage in Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on the Prior Analytics (in APr., 10, 13-28) concerning the definition of proposal (premiss or proposition). Its interest lies in the fact that Alexander establishes a very articulated relationship between the definition of proposal that we find in Aristotle's Prior Analytics (24a16-17) and that of Apophantic reason (position) in De interpretatione (4, 17a2-3). Nonetheless, the author aims to demonstrate that this relationship is problematic and unnecessary because the definition of proposal in Prior Analytics is in fact independent from the definition of Apophantic reason. However, it is also the author's intention to show why Alexander does this. [Publisher's text]